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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of the social and professional identity of 
the members of the audit committee and the characteristics of the governance system on the 
financial reporting quality. The modified Jones model was used to express the financial 
reporting quality. Given that part of the data was obtained through a questionnaire and 
another part by using financial statements. The research period was 2019 and the sample size 
was 79 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. To test the research hypotheses, the 
method of decision making artificial intelligence method and MATLAB software were 
used.The results of the section of the governance system features indicate the effect of the 
dual role of the CEO and the ratio of institutional owners on the financial reporting quality. It 
can be stated that corporate governance mechanisms can reduce opportunistic behavior; they 
can improve the quality of information by reducing the cost of representation. Also, the 
results of the audit committee's benchmarks indicate the impact of the audit committee's 
social identity and the number of employees in internal accounting section on the financial 
reporting quality, which suggests that effective audit committees, as a determining factor in 
the financial reporting process, increase the credibility of audited financial statements. In this 
study, for the first time, the impact of audit committee social identity along with other 
characteristics of governance system on the quality of financial reporting was analyzed by 
artificial intelligence. 
Keywords: Legitimate Algorithm, Financial Reporting Quality – Characteristics of 
Governance System, Audit Committee's Social and Professional Expert Identity. 
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Introduction 
The quality of financial reporting, 
promoting transparency and publishing 
high quality report are possible through 
comprehensive disclosure. The quality of 
financial reports has always been and is a 
favorite of mangers, shareholders, 
researchers and professional accountants. It 
is clear that lawmakers and investors are in 
favor of having high quality financial 
reporting, because the prevailing belief is 
that the quality of financial reporting 
directly affects capital markets [2]. On the 
other hand, the Audit Committee and the 
Governance System through the oversight 
of the financial reporting process including 
internal control system and application of 
accepted accounting principles as well as 
monitoring the independent audit 
performance, cause reduction in deliberate 
and inadvertent errors in accounting 
measurement and disclosure of important 
matters as well as fraud and illegal 
practices of management. Bédard and 
Gendron [7] also argue that the audit 
committee and the governance system 
increase information quality directly 
through monitoring financial reporting and 
indirectly by caring for and paying 
attention to internal controls and the 
independent auditor and, ultimately, 
improving the quality of information and 
strong controls can lead to increased 
investor trust and confidence in the quality 
of reporting and the efficiency of financial 
markets [19]. Due to the importance of the 
supervisory role of the company, the 
present study utilizes the characteristics of 
the social and professional identity of the 
Audit Committee and the Governance 
System to determine the quality of 
financial reporting. 
 
Theoretical foundations, literature and 
hypotheses 
Financial reporting quality 
In general, the term "financial 
reporting" means the reporting of financial 
statements and other information disclosed 
by a business unit to third parties, such as 
shareholders, creditors, customers, 
governmental organizations and the 
general public. Undoubtedly the most 
important element of financial reporting is 
the usefulness of financial reporting. 
Financial reports must be relevant, reliable, 
and understandable. These are key 
elements of the financial reporting supply 
chain and the Audit Committee and 
internal auditors and the appropriate 
governance system can greatly contribute 
to the quality of this report [11]. 
For the capital markets to survive, 
investors need to recognize the information 
of companies as being correct, complete, 
reliable and in a timely manner. They have 
to rely on information that others provide 
and this fact in many cases increases the 
risk of unreliable information. 
Shareholders can use the audited financial 
statements as one of the trusty instruments 
in order to know how to manage their 
funds and to ensure that managers are 
sound and efficient. Financial reporting as 
a major means of transmitting financial 
information to investors plays an important 
role in this regard [9]. Verrest [34] 
considers the quality of financial reporting 
as usefulness of accounting information 
and the reported amount of profit for 
enterprise stock users. In another 
definition, financial reporting quality is 
defined by the ability of financial 
statements to transmit information about 
the operations of a company and 
specifically to predict its expected cash 
flows to the investors; these are based on 
this view that accruals improve the 
information value of earnings by reducing 
the effect of unstable volatility on cash 
flows. Financial reporting quality is a 
standard that separates useful information 
from other information and enhances the 
usefulness of information. Also, the quality 
of financial reporting means that the 
financial statements are useful to investors, 
creditors, managers, and others related to 
the company [28]. 
There has been extensive research 
around the world on internal and external 
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factors affecting the quality of financial 
reporting; in short, it can be said that three 
different perspectives on corporate 
characteristics and financial reporting 
quality are competing globally. First, some 
suggest that the firm's structural 
characteristics play an important role in 
preventing managers from manipulating 
accounting figures in comparison with 
other criteria, such as monitoring or 
performance variables. Second, others 
believe that supervisory mechanisms better 
control the opportunistic behavior of 
management in preparing financial 
statements. The latter view is held by those 
who believe that performance variables can 
stop conducting unethical accounting 
activities by managers that reduces the 
quality of financial reporting and these 
variables can do this better than other two 
approaches, namely structural and 
supervisory elements, [2]. By establishing 
an audit committee and appropriate 
governance system, the quality of financial 
and accounting information improves and 
by providing and approving transparent 
financial information, the responsibility 
and accountability of the company 
management for adequate and appropriate 
disclosure and improved quality of 
financial reporting will be more under 
control. On the other hand, according to 
the theoretical concepts of financial 
reporting in Iran, one of the features of 
financial information is timely financial 
reporting, providing information to the 
users before deadline to enable them to 
make the right decisions; therefore, it is 
expected that the audit committee and the 
effective governance system perform their 
duties well and help improve timely 
financial information [16]. 
The role of audit committee and internal 
auditor on the quality of financial reporting 
One of the key responsibilities of the 
Company's Audit Committee is to review 
the major financial statement challenges 
and judgments made in preparing the 
financial statements, midterm reports and 
relevant official statements. Recent 
academic papers and recent corporate 
governance announcements have identified 
the critical role of audit committees in 
financial reporting [37]. Kalber and 
Fogarty [33] state that audit committee 
expertise enhances the quality of financial 
reporting. Goodwin [14] also advocates the 
subject that members of the audit 
committee should have financial expertise 
in addition to independence from 
management. Audit independence and 
knowledge play an important role in the 
audit committee and internal audit. An 
independent audit committee is effective in 
controlling and monitoring management 
and this increases the reliability of the 
financial statements and enhances the 
value of the company. As a result, the 
quality of accounting information 
improves and the value relationship of 
information increases. If members of the 
Audit Committee are truly independent, 
their effectiveness will be increased and 
the likelihood of discovering false reports, 
prepared by managers, will increase. 
Therefore, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the 
independence of the audit committee and 
proper management [13]. In leading 
countries, corporate audit committee has 
become an important tool to monitor the 
reliability of the financial reporting 
process. The Audit Committee acts as a 
determining factor in the financial 
reporting process. Effective Audit 
Committees enhance the validity of annual 
audited financial statements, and its 
members collaborate with the board of 
directors responsible for safeguarding the 
interests of shareholders, and assist the 
manager in performing his duties by 
contributing in monitoring the quality and 
desirability of financial statements, 
accounting, auditing and in the financial 
reporting process. Assign responsibility for 
self-help [37]. The result of using audit 
committee and efficient and regular 
internal audit in the company will greatly 
reduce the possibility of presentation false 
and distorted financial statements and 
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improve the quality of the information 
provided and its effectiveness. One of the 
most important factors that diminishes the 
quality of financial reporting is the absence 
of an efficient audit committee and internal 
audit. The primary role of the corporate 
audit committee is to oversight the 
corporate financial reporting process. 
Although the Audit Committee provides 
the most effective protection of the public 
interest, previous reviews and studies of 
the Audit Committee show great variety in 
expertise and proficiency of audit 
committee members and also the lack of 
sufficient financial and accounting 
expertise and experience of many 
committee members. Recent amendments 
to the Corporate Audit Committee have 
targeted an increase in the number of 
managers with financial expertise as a 
prominent feature of the Audit Committee. 
If the audit committee performs well in its 
oversight of financial reporting, it can be 
expected that it contributes significantly to 
improving the quality and timeliness of 
financial reporting [16]. The research 
question is therefore presented as follows: 
Do the characteristics of the audit 
committee and internal auditor affect the 
quality of financial reporting? 
The Social Identity of the Audit 
Committee and the Quality of Financial 
Reporting 
In this study, according to the research 
of Obermire (2016), the social identity of 
audit committee members are considered 
as independent variable in four dimensions 
(social identity of public sector accounting 
- social identity of executive management - 
social identity of financial management - 
social identity of investment management. 
The Social Identity of Public Sector 
Accounting 
Members of the Audit Committee with 
the social identity of Public Accounting 
have extensive experience in monitoring 
financial reporting. This is consistent with 
agency theory and the role of company 
manager with emphasis on supervision; 
and the presence of individuals with such 
experience enhances the quality of 
financial reporting, therefore, the research 
question is presented as follows: 
Is there any relationship between the 
presence of audit committees with identity 
of activity in public accounting and the 
quality of financial reporting? 
The Social Identity of Executive 
Management 
Audit Committee members with 
executive management identity have 
extensive experience in making operational 
and strategic decisions. These people, 
despite the financial and operational 
pressures of the company, can help 
management make decisions. Therefore, 
we expect these Audit Committee 
members to understand their corporate 
management role in a way that they 
recognize helping management identify 
and protect resources more important than 
management oversight. The research 
question is therefore defined as follows: 
Is there any relationship between the 
presence of audit committee with executive 
management identity and the quality of 
financial reporting? 
The Social Identity of Financial 
Management 
People with new or previous experience 
in the role of financial management have 
complex impacts on the audit committee, 
which also affects their social identities on 
the audit board. Financial management 
professionals are also very aware of past 
officials and the poor quality results of 
financial reporting. As a result, the 
research question is formulated as follows: 
Is there any relationship between audit 
committees with financial management 
identity and financial reporting quality? 
The Social Identity of Investment 
Management 
Audit Committee members with both 
banking and non-banking investment 
experience have a investment management 
social identity. In relation with their 
experience, they also devote considerable 
time to analyzing financial statements and 
assessing risks. This makes them better 
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inspectors and affects the quality of 
financial reporting. Accordingly, the 
research question is presented as follows: 
Is there a relationship between the 
existence of an audit committee with the 
identity of investment management and the 
quality of financial reporting? 
The Role of Governance System 
Characteristics on the Quality of Financial 
Reporting 
One of the factors shaping the problem 
of representation between managers and 
shareholders is the lack of information 
transparency between them, and for this 
reason, shareholders cannot continuously 
control the actions and activities of 
managers. Adequate oversight and care 
must be taken to ensure proper disclosure 
and transparency of business information 
to the public and to stakeholders. 
Supervision and oversight in this area 
requires appropriate mechanisms, 
including proper design and 
implementation of a "corporate governance 
system" in companies and firms. One of 
the most important tasks that a corporate 
governance system can undertake is to 
ensure the quality of the financial reporting 
process. The competent legal authorities, 
with codifying laws and regulations, are 
always seeking to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting using methods such as 
obliging corporate executives to approve 
what they report, strengthening and 
developing the criteria of corporate 
governance system and enhancing the 
independence of auditors. Corporate 
governance system is the implementation 
of a set of internal and external control 
mechanisms of the company that 
determines how and by whom companies 
are managed, and what the appropriate 
process of responding and publishing 
company information to stakeholders 
should be. Therefore, corporate 
governance system is a process that results 
in higher quality financial reporting by the 
managers [10]. Al Sufy, F. J. [3] examined 
the impact of corporate governance on the 
financial information quality of companies 
listed in the financial market of Oman and 
concluded that providers and users of 
financial statements are fully aware of the 
concept of corporate governance and 
applying the appropriate governance 
system is effective on the quality of 
financial information and makes financial 
information more accurate and qualitative. 
The research question is therefore 
formulated as follows: 
Do the characteristics of the governance 
system affect the quality of financial 
reporting? 
Mousavi Shiri [24] examined the role of 
internal auditors' rotation on the quality of 
financial reporting. The data used in this 
study were extracted from the sources of 
corporates board reports, audited financial 
statements for the six-year period 2011-
2016, as well as through interviews with 
senior executives of internal audit unit, 50 
sample companies. The results showed that 
there is no significant relationship between 
the systematic rotation of auditors towards 
management position and also the rotation 
of internal audit staff within the audit unit 
with the quality of financial reporting; and 
the oversight of the Audit Committee and 
the financial expertise of internal auditors 
are also unaffected. 
Taghavi and Nazari [32] examined the 
moderating effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the relationship between 
cash holdings level and financial reporting 
quality, by selecting 149 companies listed 
on the Tehran Stock Exchange for a five-
year period from March 2012 to the end of 
February 2016. The findings indicated that 
the different criteria defined by corporate 
governance (except board independence 
and management ownership) had a positive 
and significant effect on cash level and the 
duality of the role of CEO from the board 
of directors had a negative and significant 
effect on cash holding.  
Parsa and Motevasel [26] investigated 
the effect of audit committee 
characteristics on the quality of financial 
reporting in companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. The statistical 
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sample of the study consists of 69 
companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange during 1836 to 1861. In this 
study, audit committee characteristics 
including financial expertise of the 
members, audit committee size, and audit 
committee members being non-executive 
and financial reporting quality were 
calculated by the modified Jones model 
(2008). The results show that only the 
financial expertise feature of audit 
committee members affect financial 
reporting quality.  
Fakhari and Rezai Pate-Noi [12] 
analyzed the impact of the audit committee 
on the information environment of the 
company. Company information 
environment was measured by observable 
variables including company size, 
institutional ownership, company 
development opportunities, company life, 
bid-ask price range, number of 
shareholders of the company, earnings 
forecast error, stock turnover rate, 
Amihood illiquidity criterion and stock 
return fluctuation, as a comprehensive 
index, and the impact of the presence of 
audit committee on corporate information 
environment was tested for the period of 4 
years before and after the approval of 
internal control guidelines in 2012, during 
the years 2008 to 2015. The results 
indicate that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between audit 
committee and company information 
environment. In other words, with the 
establishment of the audit committee in 
companies, their information environment 
has become more transparent and the index 
value has increased.  
Nikbakht and Ahmad Khan Beigi [25] 
examined the impact of corporate 
governance on the quality of financial 
reporting: an integrated approach. 
According to the results of statistical tests, 
there is a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality, so that the correlation 
between these two variables is 0.607 and 
their coefficient of determination is 0.368. 
Accordingly, corporate governance 
variables alone could predict 36.8% of the 
change in the quality of a company's 
financial reporting. The results showed that 
corporate governance has a positive and 
significant relationship with financial 
reporting quality and can predict changes 
in the quality of corporate financial 
reporting. These results are consistent with 
the results of research in emerging 
markets. Also among the impact of the 
examined dimensions of corporate 
governance on financial reporting quality, 
two dimensions of audit and ownership 
structure had significant effect on financial 
reporting quality.  
Alavi et al. [4] examined the impact of 
audit committee activity on financial 
reporting. The results show that there is no 
significant difference between the rate of 
disclosure point difference and the number 
and proportion of post-test annual 
adjustments between the two experimental 
and control groups; in other words, the 
audit committee's activities did not yet 
improve the quality of financial reporting 
significantly in the two years following the 
establishment of these committees. 
Contrary to these findings, the results of 
the complementary tests based on the event 
study method show that the formation of 
audit committees for the companies in the 
experimental group, regardless of the 
control groups, has resulted in a decrease 
in the number of annual adjustments and 
an increase in the information disclosure 
point of the companies.  
Zarei and Ghasemi [37] examined the 
effect of audit committee characteristics on 
the quality of financial reporting. In this 
study, we used earnings management 
variable to evaluate the quality of financial 
reporting. The results of the testing the 
research hypotheses show that there is no 
relationship between audit committee 
characteristics such as independence, 
expertise of members, experience of 
member as a manager and number of audit 
committee members with earnings 
management.  
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Bazrafshan et al. [6] in a study titled 
meta-analysis of audit committee 
independence and financial reporting 
quality, found that there was no significant 
relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings management 
and quality ratings, whereas there was a 
significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and quality of 
accruals, abnormal returns, and 
representation and fraud.  
Yiwei Dou [36] examined the impact of 
financial reporting quality on the 
investment efficiency of US stock 
companies. The results show that selecting 
and applying existing equity enhances the 
quality of financial reporting due to its true 
fair value, which in turn enhances 
investment efficiency by reducing the 
problem of inappropriate selection by low-
investment firms.  
Ralf and Alfred [29] examined the 
impact of increased performance on 
financial reporting quality and audit 
quality. Their hypothesis was that 
increased public executive power improves 
the quality of financial reporting and the 
quality of auditing. In a model with a 
manager who could manage the earnings, a 
strategic auditor and an executive 
institution, they showed that audit 
performance has been completed in a poor 
performance regime, but it could replace a 
strong one. Although strong 
implementation always reduces profit 
management, the effects of different 
reinforcement tools are ambiguous. They 
showed that they can influence the quality 
of financial reporting and the quality of 
auditing depending on the production risk, 
characteristics of the accounting system, 
and the scope of the audit toward 
performance.  
Al-Shaer [5] examined the relationship 
between audit committees and the quality 
of financial reporting in the UK. Their 
main purpose is to examine the quality of 
disclosure of information by focusing on 
the role of audit committees. In this regard, 
they used information from 350 English 
companies during 2007-2011. Their 
findings suggest that companies with a 
high quality audit committee have a higher 
quality of information disclosure and 
financial reporting. In addition, large 
corporations with major shareholders have 
a high volume of information disclosure, 
although the quality of the audit committee 
does not affect the volume of disclosure. 
Kibiya [18] examined the relationship 
between the independence and expertise of 
audit committee members, ownership, and 
financial reporting quality. They used 
information from 101 non-financial 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange for the period 2010-2014. Their 
findings, using multivariate regression, 
show that supervision activities of audit 
committee affect the quality of financial 
reporting. In addition, the variables of 
members' expertise and independence as 
well as equity ownership have a significant 
effect on the quality of financial reporting.  
Moses [23] examined the impact of the 
size of audit committees on the quality of 
financial reporting in Nigerian banks. He 
tested the hypotheses by using data from 
listed banks in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, using the modified Jones model 
as a measure of financial reporting quality. 
His findings show that the size of the audit 
committee has no significant effect on the 
quality of financial reporting.  
Habib and Bhuiyan [15] examined the 
impact of the problem of the board of 
directors on the audit committee and the 
quality of financial reporting in companies 
listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange. Their results show that the 
board of directors has a positive effect on 
the relationship between the audit 
committee and real earnings management, 
and this effect is more outstanding in the 
case of executive manager who have 
problem in reporting fraudulent reports.  
Leong et al. [20] examined the 
relationship between audit committees and 
the quality of financial reporting in 
Singapore. They considered some of the 
committee's features, such as independence 
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or expertise, and examined their effect on 
the financial reporting quality of 
companies listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange. Their main findings indicate 
that the quality of financial reporting 
would be improved if there were 
accounting, financial management or 
supervision expertise in the committee. 
Another point which is about the 
independence variable is that it has not had 
a significant impact on improving the 
quality of financial reporting since most of 
the audit committees are composed of 
independent members.  
In a study, Wang et al. [35] investigated 
the relationship between the establishment 
of audit committees, information 
transparency, and earnings quality using 
the Simultaneous Equation Model. The 
results indicated that the establishment of 
audit committees was positively related to 
transparency of information and quality of 
earnings.  
Kamarudin and Ismail [17] show that 
there is a negative relationship between 
some characteristics of the audit committee 
and the quality of fraudulent financial 
reporting. For example, the experience of 
audit committee members has a negative 
relationship with fraudulent financial 
reporting.  
Schmidt & Wilkins [30] examined the 
impact of audit quality and financial 
expertise of the audit committee on the 
timely presentation of financial reporting 
after a time interval and for representation 
of financial statements. The results 
indicated that companies with specialist 
audit committee have more timely 
disclosures and the lack of expertise of 
audit committee members results in a 38% 
reduction in timely financial statements.  
Abdukadir [1] in a study entitled audit 
committee characteristics and quality of 
financial reports, found that audit 
committee independence and expertise had 
a significant relationship with improving 
the quality of financial reports. The audit 
committee is five to four meetings per year 
and its size is 5 members. The results also 
showed that 70% of sample companies 
employ people other than four senior 
auditors. 
The following hypotheses have been 
formulated with respect to the theoretical 
foundations and the purpose of this study: 
1- The governance system criteria affect 
the quality of financial reporting with an 
artificial intelligence rule-based approach. 
2. The audit committee and internal 
auditor's criteria affect the quality of 
financial reporting with an artificial 
intelligence rule-based approach. 
 
Research Method 
Statistical Population and Sample 
The statistical population of this 
research is the companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange in 2019. Information 
about social identity of audit committee is 
extracted through questionnaire and 
information about other variables of 
governance system and audit committee is 
extracted from Rahavard Novin software. 
Research variables 
The research variables are as follows. 
 
Figure 1: Research variables 
Primary independent variables Operational definition 
Board size The number of members of the board of directors 
Dual Role of the CEO If the CEO is the Chairman or Vice President of the 
Board of Directors, number 1, otherwise zero is 
considered. 
Ratio of Non-Executive Directors Number of Non-Executive Board Members to Total 
Board Members 
The percentage of institutional owners As defined in paragraph 27 of Article 1 of the Securities 
Market Act, banks, corporations and any person holding 
more than 5% of the issued shares is considered as the 
criterion for calculating the institutional shareholder. 
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Findings 
Descriptive statistics of research 
The descriptive statistics of the 
independent and dependent variables of the 
study are described in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive statistics 
variable mean median max min SD 
The ratio of non-executive directors 0/62 0/60 1 0/2 0/19 
Percentage of institutional owners 70/24 75 98/05 1827 19/24 
Concentration of ownership 0/32 0/31 0/75 0/01 0/19 
Dual role of CEO 0/33 0 1 0 0/47 
Board size 5 5 5 5 0 
Number of Audit Committee Members 3/11 3 5 3 0/45 
Financial expertise of Audit Committee members 0/75 0/67 1 0 0/24 
Independence of Audit Committee 0/72 0/67 1 0 0/19 
Number of staff of Internal Audit Unit 2/33 1 11 1 2/20 
Investment Management Experience 4/99 5 15 0 2/73 
Financial Management Experience 4/80 5 12 0 2/15 
Executive Management Experience 3/76 4 10 0 2/69 
Public Sector Accounting Experience 5/13 5 12 0 2/80 
Financial Reporting Quality -0/08 -0/07 -0/02 -0/19 0/05 
 
Figure 2 shows that the average 
proportion of non-executive directors is 
greater than 0.5. Therefore, it can be stated 
that most sample firms have more non-
executive directors than the executive 
director in the board structure. The 
percentage of institutional owners in the 
sample surveyed is more than 50%, 
indicating that more sample companies are 
among the group of firms with higher 
institutional owners and based on the 
results of the descriptive statistics of the 
board size, it can be concluded that all the 
samples studied have 5-member board 
members and for the greater confidence 
during the period 2011 to 2017, all the 
Board members of 213 companies active in 
the seven-year period were also examined, 
which confirms the same result as among 
the 1491 companies listed on Tehran Stock 
Exchange, only 48 observations have 7-
member board of directors and the rest of 
The focus of ownership The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Number of Audit Committee Members Number of Audit Committee Members of the company 
Independence of the Audit Committee The number of non-executive members of the Audit 
Committee divided by the total number of members 
Audit Committee expertise Number of Audit Committee members with financial 
expertise divided by total members 
Number of staff of Internal Audit Unit Number of members of Internal Audit Unit 
The Social Identity of Investment 
Management 
The number of years that Audit Committee members 
have investing experience. 
Social Identity of Financial Management The number of years that Audit Committee members 
have financial management experience. 
Social Identity of Executive 
Management 
The number of years that Audit Committee members 
have the experience of executive management. 
The Social Identity of Public Sector 
Accounting 
The number of years that members of the Audit 
Committee have experience in accounting in public 
sector 
dependent variable Financial reporting quality (modified Jones model) 
Research Method Cart Rule-Based Artificial Intelligence Algorithm 
Research period 2019 
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the companies have 5-member board, so 
this variable is omitted from the final 
results of the study and it can be stated that 
other number of board members as an 
indicator of governance system in 
accounting research cannot be a suitable 
variable due to the sameness of the 
numbers of members. Regarding the 
financial expertise of the members of the 
Audit Committee, given the mean and 
median value, it can be stated that the 
sample examined has more expert 
members in the composition of the Audit 
Committee. Given that the mean and 
median of the independence of the Audit 
Committee is greater than 0.65, it can 
therefore be argued that independent 
members of the Audit Committee are more 
than independent members. Given the 
mean of social identity criteria of the Audit 
Committee for investment management 
experience, financial management 
experience, executive management 
experience, and public sector accounting 
experience, it can therefore be argued that 
most members of the audit committee have 
accounting experience, particularly in the 
public sector. 
Decision Tree 
Cart decision tree is similar to the C5 
tree, but it uses Gini index instead of 
entropy. The Gini index relation is defined 
as follows. 
(1) 
( )21 −=
j
jgini cpI  
In which p(Cj) shows the proportion of 
absolute data to class C. This algorithm 
first calculates the Gini index for all the 
properties of the initial data using the 
relation (1). Then, the information gain of 
each of the attributes is obtained from the 
following relation. 
(2) 
( ) ( )AIIAGain
g in iresgini
−=  
These relationships mean that the error 
of the hypothesis h on the learning data is 
less than the error h' but the error h on the 
whole data is greater than h 'and this is 
called over-learning. Figure (1) illustrates 
that as the tree size (number of nodes) 
increases, the accuracy of the learning data 
increases but the accuracy of the test data 
decreases; therefore, there is a need for 
methods to stop tree growth from one point 
and prevent the phenomenon of over-
learning. 
?? is calculated from relation (2), where 
?? is the amount of irregularity remaining 
in the categories due to the use of the 
feature A which is obtainable with the help 
of the sum of the probabilities of each of 
the divisions. Then the feature F which has 
the most gain is selected as the root of the 
splitting feature. 
(3) 
( ) ( ) ( )  















−=
j j
jres acpapAI gini
2
|1  
 In relation (3), a is the subcategory 
created by selecting the Ath feature as the 
splitting feature. 
 Overlearning and avoidance techniques 
Suppose there is a hypothesis called h 
(here we mean the decision tree). 
Hypothesis error h on learning data is 
displayed as errortrain (h) and error on all 
data is displayed as errorD (h). The 
hypothesis h overlearned the learning data, 
if there is another hypothesis (tree) such as 
h' and the following conditions are in 
place. 
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )herrorherrorandherrorherror DDtraintrian  
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Figure 1: The concept of over-learning in the decision tree 
 
Methods for overcoming the decision 
tree over-learning have been proposed, 
which are called pruning, and are divided 
into two categories: 
A number of methods prevent the tree 
from growing before it is fully grown. 
Setting a benchmark for when to stop 
growing is one of the challenges of such 
methods. Stopping the tree before the tree 
is full is called pre-pruning. In the second 
set of approaches of facing over-learning, 
the tree is first allowed to grow fully and 
then pruning happens. These methods are 
called post-pruning. In practice it is shown 
that the first method is very fast but the 
efficiency of the second method is higher. 
The training data is then applied to the Cart 
decision tree algorithm and the Cart 
decision tree uses this data to make an 
estimation tree. In the learning phase of the 
tree, the tree is initially allowed to grow 
completely and then pruning beings using 
validation data to deal with the over-
learning phenomenon. After training the 
Cart tree, the tree structure will be stored in 
the computer memory. It is now applied to 
evaluate the test data which were not yet 
observed by the tree, and the test error is 
calculated. 
Data division using a 10-fold cross-
validation method 
Before the data is entered into the 
decision tree model, we need to divide it 
into two classes of training and test data. 
For this purpose, a 10-fold cross-validation 
method is used. In this method, the data set 
(company set) is divided into 10 equal 
parts randomly, so that for the thesis data 
which is about 80 samples in total there are 
about 8 samples in each segment which are 
selected randomly from the companies. 
The 10 pair sets {x_i, 〖_ i〗} _ (i = 1) ^ 
10 are extracted randomly, in which Xi is 
the independent variables and Yi is the Ith 
sample dependent variables. In the first 
run, the first part of the 10 sections is used 
to test the remaining 9 parts for the training 
data. For example, in Figure 2: For the first 
run the 10th piece is used as test data and 
the 1st piece is used as training data. In the 
second run, the 9th piece was used as the 
evaluation data of the 1st to 8th and 10th 
pieces as training data. In other 
performances, another part of 10 parts is 
used for testing, and the remaining 9 parts 
for training. The algorithm is executed the 
same way 10 times. Figure 2 shows the 
data division in 10 replications. 
 
 
Figure 2: Steps for selecting two training and test data sets with 10-fold cross-validation 
 
 
At each replication, a prediction error 
rate for the training data and a prediction 
error rate for the test data are calculated. 
Finally, the average error rates obtained are 
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assigned as the error rates of the training 
data and test data, and are shown in the 
tables of results. The reason for using this 
method is that one of the criteria used to 
evaluate a classifier / regressor is the error 
rate which has different types. Generally, it 
is not possible to have a proper judgement 
on the algorithms abilities with the 
comparison of calculated error on training 
data. The error rate on training data is 
usually lower than the error rate on data 
not seen in the learning process. With this 
argument, learning error cannot be used to 
compare two algorithms. This is because 
for more complex models, classifiers that 
usually have more parameters have more 
complex boundaries. This complex 
boundary reduces the error on training data 
compared to simpler models; therefore, in 
addition to the training data set, a set of 
data is required for the test. In the case of 
decision trees due to the phenomenon of 
over-fitting, in addition to the two training 
and test data sets, another set of data called 
the validation data set is required which is 
selected from the training data set (over-
fitting or over-learning is one of the 
biggest problems in the learning process 
and one way to prevent it is using 
validation data). Therefore, each dataset is 
divided into three independent subsets of 
training data, validation data, and test data. 
The training data is used for model 
learning and the validation data for the 
prevention of overlearning. The test data is 
used to calculate the algorithm error rate 
(model prediction error) on data that has 
not been observed so far. Of course, one 
algorithm implementation is not sufficient 
for the evaluation to be appropriate. 
Usually, algorithms tend to approximate 
their estimated error rates to the actual 
error rates (real-world errors), this action is 
possible by repeatedly performing the 
learning and evaluation process; therefore, 
when a dataset is provided, a part of it is 
set aside for final evaluation and the rest is 
used for training and validating, and again 
the three sets are changed and the model is 
reevaluated. This process is performed by 
10-fold cross-validation. Thirteen 
independent variables from 10 different 
industries for 79 companies were collected 
in 2017. The names of these industries and 
companies are shown in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Name of the industries surveyed 
# Name of the industry 
1 Automotive and parts manufacturing 
2 Cement, lime and plaster 
3 basic metals 
4 Ceramic and tile 
5 Rubber & Plastic 
6 Electric machines 
7 equipment and machinery 
8 chemical products 
9 Food and beverage except sugar 
10 Pharmaceutical materials and products 
 
Figure 4: the name of surveyed companies 
# Company name # 
Company 
name 
# 
Company 
name 
# 
Company 
name 
1 Saipa Azin 21 Surud Cement 41 Saadi Tiles 61 Salemin 
2 
Iran khordro 
Diesel 
22 Isfahan Cement 42 Behsaram 62 
Pegah 
Azarbayejan 
3 Parskhodro 23 Soofian Cement 43 Iran Yasa 63 Shahd Iran 
4 Saze Pooyesh 24 Gharb Cement 44 Iran Tire 64 Mahram 
5 Tractor Casting 25 Fars No Cement 45 Sahand Tires 65 Noosh 
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Mazandaran 
6 Iran Radiators 26 Ghaen Cement 46 Sanati Barrez 66 
Abooreyhan 
Pharmaceutical 
Co. 
7 
Iran Casting 
Industries 
27 
Neyriz White 
Cement 
47 
Plasscocar 
Saipa 
67 
Daroopakhsh 
Factories 
8 Zamyad 28 Kalsimin 48 Iran Transfo 68 
Osveh 
Pharmaceutical 
co. 
9 Saipa 29 Iran Aluminum 49 Shahid Ghandi 69 
Alborz 
Pharmaceutical 
Co. 
10 
Khodro Shargh 
Electric 
30 Bahonar Copper 50 Niroo Trans 70 
Amin 
Pharmaceutical 
co. 
11 
(Lent Tormoz) 
Brake Pads 
31 
Kashan 
Amirkabir Steel 
51 
Agricultural 
Services 
71 
Pars 
Pharmaceutical 
co. 
12 Niroo Mohareke 32 Khorasan Steel 52 Absal 72 
Daroopakhsh 
Materials 
13 
Tractor 
Motorsazan 
33 
Khoozestan 
Steel 
53 
Shazand 
Petrochemical 
co. 
73 
Zagros 
Pharmed Pars 
14 Mehrkam Pars 34 Sanaati Sepahan 54 
Abadan 
Petrochemical 
co 
74 
Razak 
Pharmaceutical 
co. 
15 Iran Khodro 35 
Iran National 
Copper Industry 
55 Karin Iran 75 
Shimi 
Daroopakhsh 
16 Darab Cement 36 
Navard 
Aluminum 
56 
Piazar Kesht O 
Sanaat 
76 
Injectable 
Products 
17 
Oroomiyeh 
Cement 
37 
Navard Steel 
Parts 
57 Kalber Diary 77 
Kosar 
Pharmaceutical 
co. 
18 Tehran Cement 38 
Isfahan 
Mobarake Steel 
58 Behnoosh 78 Daru Eksir 
19 Khash Cement 39 Taksaram Tiles 59 Pak Diary 79 Iran Daru 
20 Khazar Cement 40 Sina Tiles 60 Pars Minoo   
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency chart of 
the continuous variable of financial 
reporting quality in 25 quarters for all 
companies. 
 
 
Figure 3: Frequency chart of financial reporting quality in 25 quarts 
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The importance of independent 
variables for explaining the quality of 
financial reporting 
After training the Cart decision tree 
with the training data, important variables 
to predict the quality of financial reporting 
are shown in Fig. (4); the name of the 
variables x1 through x13 are shown in 
Figure 4. This significance is obtained 
based on the Gini index in division of the 
training data in the Cart decision tree. As 
can be seen, the important variables for 
predicting the quality of financial reporting 
are: 1- Investment management 
experience, 2- Number of internal audit 
staff, 3- Financial management experience, 
4- Executive management experience, 5- 
Public sector accounting experience, 6- 
Percentage of institutional owners and 7- 
Dual role of CEOs. 
 
Figure 4: The importance of independent variables in predicting the quality of financial 
reporting 
 
Figure 5: Symbol of the independent variables in the Cart decision tree 
# Independent Variables 
x1 Dual role of the CEO 
x2 Number of board of directors 
x3 Proportion of non-executive directors 
x4 Proportion of instituitional owners 
x5 Concentraton of ownership 
x6 
Number of members in audit 
committee 
x7 
Financial expertise of members in 
audit committee 
x8 Independence of audit committee 
X9 
Number of employees in internal audit 
unit 
X10 Experience of investment management 
X11 Experience of financial management 
X12 Experience of executive management 
X13 
Experience of accounting in public 
sector 
 
Prediction Evaluation Criteria of 
Financial Reporting Quality  
The 10-fold cross-validation method is 
used for implementation and evaluation. 
After dividing the observations into two 
sets of training and test data using 10-fold 
cross validation method, three evaluation 
criteria were used to evaluate the models, 
namely mean absolute error, mean squared 
error, and symmetric mean absolute 
percentage error, which is obtained using 
the following relationships.  
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In the above equations Yi and Di are the 
real dependent variable and the dependent 
variable predicted by the algorithms for the 
ith company-year, and n represent the 
number of company-years (in the learning 
or evaluation phase) and y and d  are the 
mean of the real and predicted dependent 
variable, respectively. The training data 
and the test divided by the 10-fold cross-
validation method were given to the Cart. 
The decision tree model is shown in figure 
(5). As it can be seen, this tree has a depth 
of 6 and is understandable and usable for 
humans. It should be noted that extracting 
such a tree and determining the 
significance of the independent variables 
of the problem could not be done by an 
expert, and therefore the Cart algorithm, 
which is a very powerful data mining tool, 
was used in this study. 
 
 
Figure 5: Cart decision tree for explaining the quality of financial reporting 
  
For better understanding of this decision 
tree, the rules which are extracted from it 
are given as follows. As the shape and 
rules say, 14 laws can be used to determine 
the quality of financial reporting. These 14 
rules are of the rules which are under the 
leaves meaning that they are at the end of 
rules 4, 5, 9, 11, 16-20, 23-27. 
Decision tree for regression 
1 if x10<0.166667 then node 2 elseif 
x10>=0.166667 then node 3 else -
0.0752833 
2 if x9<0.05 then node 4 elseif 
x9>=0.05 then node 5 else -0.100339 
3 if x12<0.25 then node 6 elseif 
x12>=0.25 then node 7 else -0.069411 
4 fit = -0.126296 
5 fit = -0.0614028 
6 if x9<0.3 then node 8 elseif 
x9>=0.3 then node 9 else -0.0877672 
7 if x10<0.733333 then node 10 
elseif x10>=0.733333 then node 11 else -
0.0568514 
8 if x11<0.375 then node 12 elseif 
x11>=0.375 then node 13 else -0.0805232 
9 fit = -0.143305 
10 if x1<0.5 then node 14 elseif 
x1>=0.5 then node 15 else -0.0540903 
11 fit = -0.159013 
12 if x13<0.375 then node 16 elseif 
x13>=0.375 then node 17 else -0.107415 
13 if x11<0.541667 then node 18 
elseif x11>=0.541667 then node 19 else -
0.0598369 
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14 if x4<0.642329 then node 20 elseif 
x4>=0.642329 then node 21 else -
0.046239 
15 if x13<0.458333 then node 22 
elseif x13>=0.458333 then node 23 else -
0.0669889 
16 fit = -0.14756 
17 fit = -0.0902105 
18 fit = -0.0468457 
19 fit = -0.0749933 
20 fit = -0.0301812 
21 if x10<0.3 then node 24 elseif 
x10>=0.3 then node 25 else -0.0565619 
22 if x9<0.05 then node 26 elseif 
x9>=0.05 then node 27 else -0.0770261 
23 fit = -0.0418958 
24 fit = -0.0250185 
25 fit = -0.0740861 
26 fit = -0.0922703 
27 fit = -0.0541599 
 
After executing the learning process of 
decision tree model, in order to verify how 
successfully the model has passed the 
learning process, first the same training 
data which were previously given to the 
algorithms to learn its model parameters, is 
given to the model with the learned 
parameters as an evaluation sample; the 
difference in this case is that the models 
explain the value of the dependent 
variable, then the mean of 10 error criteria 
of the 10-fold cross validation method are 
calculated which are reported in Figure (6). 
The closer these errors are to zero, the 
better the models learn. The SMAPE error, 
if multiplied by 100, indicates the 
percentage of symmetric mean absolute 
error. This error, according to its 
definition, is a number between 0% and 
200%. As shown in the figure, the Cart 
algorithm has a SMAPE value of 13.9%, 
and considering the range of this error, it is 
acceptable. Also, by observing the MAE 
with a mean of 0.021 for 10 performances 
with different training data, it can be said 
that the Cart decision tree can predict and 
recognize the importance of independent 
variables to influence the quality of 
financial reporting with low error. 
 
 
Figure 6: The errors mean for evaluation of training rate of decision tree model 
Fold MSE Train SMAPE Train MAE Train 
1 0/00072 0/44 0/0212 
2 000/70 0/133 0/0208 
3 0/00061 0/131 0/0196 
4 0/00068 0/139 0/0204 
5 0/00075 0/141 0/215 
6 0/00071 0/137 0/0210 
7 0/00077 0/145 0/0217 
8 0/00037 0/143 0/0210 
9 0/00071 0/135 0/0208 
10 0/00072 0/142 0/0212 
AVG 0/00071 0/139 0/021 
 
But what we need to worry about is the 
phenomenon of over-fitting. For this 
reason, to examine the generality of the 
models presented, the error rates of MAE, 
MSE, and SMAPE for explaining the 
dependent variable of financial reporting 
quality for companies in 2017, the tests of 
the companies that were set aside by the 
10-fold validation method in each 
replication and the algorithms have not yet 
seen them, have been obtained. For each 
error criterion, 10 errors each reported by 
the 10-fold validation method, are acquired 
and the mean of these errors is shown in 
figure . Similar to the previous one, it is 
concluded that the obtained models are 
general, that is, they perform well for 
companies that have never seen them, and 
that the problem of over-fitting did not 
occur, as the difference between the error 
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criteria of the training and evaluation data is negligible. 
 
Figure 7: Mean of errors for estimating the power of decision tree model explanations 
Fold MSE Test SMAPE Test MAE Test 
1 0/00059 0/102 0/0183 
2 0/00079 0/216 0/0220 
3 0/00170 0/128 0/0350 
4 0/00096 0/137 0/0256 
5 0/00042 0/122 0/0156 
6 0/00067 0/163 0/0202 
7 0/00022 0/087 0/0138 
8 0/00055 0/109 0/0203 
9 0/00069 0/185 0/0221 
10 0/00065 0/112 0/0181 
AVG 0/00072 0/145 0/0211 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to 
investigate the impact of social and 
professional identity characteristics of 
audit committee and internal accounting 
members and governance system features 
on the quality of financial reporting. For 
this, the financial information of 79 
companies in 2017 was used. The results 
of the governance system features indicate 
the impact of the dual role of the CEO and 
the proportion of institutional owners on 
the quality of financial reporting, which 
can be argued that the corporate 
governance mechanisms can reduce 
opportunistic behavior, which can improve 
the quality of information while reducing 
agency costs. One of the most important 
tasks that a corporate governance system 
can undertake is ensuring the quality of the 
financial reporting process. Al Sufy et al. 
[3] stated that applying a corporate 
governance system affects the quality of 
financial information and makes the 
information more accurate and high 
quality. Chang, J. Ch & Sun, h. L [8] found 
in a study that after financial scandals, 
investors were more aware that the dual 
role of a CEO may jeopardize the trustee's 
role of board of directors in overseeing 
financial reporting. In addition, they 
argued that dual role of the CEO could 
potentially increase the risk of the CEO 
being the ultimate decision maker in 
financial reporting. The results of the 
research of Moeinuddin and Dehghan [22] 
indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between the percentage of 
ownership of institutional investors and the 
final score of corporate disclosure and its 
components. Nikbakht and Ahmad Khan 
Beigi [25] and Mehrani et al. [21] also 
found a direct relationship between 
institutional ownership and financial 
reporting quality. The results of audit 
committee criteria indicate the impact of 
audit committee social identity and the 
number of internal audit staff on financial 
reporting quality. It can be said that 
effective audit committees increase the 
validity of audited financial statements as a 
determining factor in the financial 
reporting process. Members of this 
committee cooperate with the board of 
directors who is responsible for 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders, 
and monitor the quality and desirability of 
financial statements, accounting, auditing, 
internal control, and the reporting process 
[27]. As stated in the theoretical 
foundations, the experience of the 
members of the audit committee in the area 
of public sector accounting, investment, 
financial management and executive 
management has a significant impact on 
increasing the efficiency of the audit 
committee. Ralph and Alfred [29], Al-
Shaer et al. [5] Kibiya,  et al. [18]; Habib 
and Bhuiyan [15]; Sun et al [31]; Parsa and 
Motevasel [26]; Fotouhi [13] and Heidari 
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[16] pointed out the relationship between 
audit committee characteristics and the 
quality of financial reporting. Mousavi 
Shiri [2245]; Alavi et al. [4] and Zarei and 
Qasemi [37] state that audit committee 
oversight and the financial expertise of 
internal auditors also have no impact on 
the quality of financial reporting. 
According to the results of the study, it 
seems that the role of corporate 
governance system and social identity of 
the audit committee and internal auditor in 
Tehran Stock Exchange is effective on 
enhancing the quality of corporate 
financial reporting; therefore, the audit 
committee has a positive impact on the 
performance of the accounting and internal 
audit units as well as the financial 
reporting quality of each entity if it is 
established to function properly in the 
entities, so the formation of this committee 
should be considered important. 
It is recommended that shareholders and 
general assemblies of corporations seek to 
appoint non-executive directors for their 
board to enhance the quality of financial 
reporting in addition to enhancing the 
independence of the board of directors. 
Users of financial reports should also be 
aware that having supervisory mechanisms 
provides sufficient assurance of 
information quality and reduction of 
information asymmetry. 
 The Securities and Stock Exchange 
Organization should implement a coherent 
system for evaluating the quality of 
corporate governance system, and oblige 
companies to a greater extent to implement 
effective and efficient corporate 
governance system. 
In addition, by expanding the theoretical 
studies and literature of the corporate 
governance system, stock exchange 
activists, corporate board members, 
shareholders, audit firms, researchers, ... 
become more familiar with corporate 
governance issues so that they can, 
appropriately play a role in the corporate 
governance system and therefore enhance 
the quality of corporate financial reporting. 
It should be noted that the social 
identity of the audit committee and their 
past experience play an important role in 
the efficiency of the audit committee's 
duty, so we recommend this to companies 
decision makers. 
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